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The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed two main approaches to the analysis of monetary 
policy.  The first is the early new classical approach of Lucas, based on the assumptions 
of rational expectations and market clearing.  The second is the atheoretical econometrics 
of Sims’s VAR program.  Both have developed:  the new classical approach has been 
enriched through various accounts of price stickiness, cost of adjustment or alternative 
expectational schemes; the original VAR program has developed into the structural VAR 
program.  This paper clarifies the relationship between these two programs.  Based on 
work of Cochrane (1998), it shows that the typical method of evaluating unanticipated, 
unsystematic monetary policy is correct only if the conditions necessary for Lucas’s 
policy-ineffectiveness proposition hold, while recent methods for evaluating systematic 
monetary policy violate Lucas’s policy-noninvariance proposition (“the Lucas critique”).  
The paper shows how to construct and estimate (using regime changes) a model in which 
some agents form rational-expectations and others follow rules of thumb.  In such a 
model, monetary policy actions can be validly decomposed into systematic and 
unsystematic components and valid counterfactual experiments on alternative systematic 
monetary-policy rules can be evaluated. 
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Measuring Systematic Monetary Policy 
 
The financial press hangs on the words of every Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, 
every President of a Federal Reserve Bank, and most of all, of course, on the words of 
Chairman Alan Greenspan.  In his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee on July 
20, 2000, Greenspan said: 
Most recently we have needed to raise rates to relatively high levels in real terms 
in response to the side effects of accelerating growth and related demand-supply 
imbalances.  Variations in the stance of policy – or keeping it the same – in 
response to evolving forces are made in the framework of an unchanging 
objective – to foster as best we can those financial conditions most likely to 
promote sustained economic expansion at the highest rate possible. . . 
Irrespective of the complexities of economic change, our primary goal is to find 
those policies that best contribute to a noninflationary environment and hence to 
growth.  The Federal Reserve, I trust will always remain vigilant in pursuit of 
that goal. 
 
Chairman Greenspan is well known for his inscrutability; yet the message here is exactly 
the one that the financial markets read into Federal Reserve policy:  while ultimately it 
may aim to control inflation, it does so through contingent responses to inflation and real 
developments, and it expects its policy actions to affect the real economy systematically.  
The manner in which the Federal Reserve determines these contingent responses is 
central in the analysis of optimal policy-reactions function – provided, of course, that the 
Fed is right and that systematic monetary policy does have economically significant 
effects on the real economy.   
  Starting in the early 1970s, new classical economists led by Robert Lucas began 
to question whether systematic monetary policy in fact had the required real effects.    2
Over time, many macroeconomists have come to believe that, because of substantial 
frictions (e.g., price stickiness and limited participation in financial markets), systematic 
monetary policy does matter.   Recent empirical analysis of monetary policy has typically 
used the econometric framework of vector autoregressions (VARs). Motivated in large 
measure by Lucas’s argument that the coefficients of estimated macroeconomic 
relationships should not be invariant to changes in monetary-policy regime (the “Lucas 
critique”), practitioners have focused on unanticipated and unsystematic policy shocks. 
These shocks account for little of the variability of the instruments of monetary policy 
and, naturally, are of less interest to markets or politicians than is systematic policy.  Yet 
the way in which VARs are interpreted implicitly assumes that Lucas’s original argument 
– that systematic monetary policy is ineffective – is correct.  There is a logical 
disconnection between the usual way in which VARs are interpreted and the belief that 
systematic monetary policy matters.  
  The aim of this paper is to analyze systematic monetary policy in a VAR 
framework in a way that is logically consistent.  The key insight – originally by John 
Cochrane (1998) – is that the effect of systematic monetary policy depends on the 
balance of economic actors between those who behave as ideal new classical agents 
(frictionless competitors with rational expectations) and those who follow rules of thumb 
or face other frictions.  Our own innovation is to suggest a method of using regime 
changes (the Lucas critique) to identify that balance empirically.  Our purpose is both 
critical (we try to understand some of the recent literature in a common framework) and 
positive (we present an empirical assessment of U.S. monetary policy). 
   3
 
1. Monetary policy after Lucas and Sims 
Before the 1970s quantitative monetary-policy analysis had two important features.  
Orthodox monetary policy was typically viewed in a target-and-instruments framework in 
which the monetary authority sought to achieve a goal for inflation, GDP, or 
unemployment using money or some more directly controllable monetary instrument as 
the means.  Monetarists and Keynesians debated the relative merits of fixed rules versus 
discretionary policies.  Monetary economists investigated the relative merits of different 
ultimate and intermediate targets and of different instruments.  The literature on optimal 
control suggested that rules need not be simple as, say, Milton Friedman preferred, but 
could be feedback rules allowing for nuanced responses to different contingencies.  The 
second feature was that orthodox policy analysis was typically conducted in the context 
of large-scale macroeconometric models.   
  In the 1970s, the orthodoxy was attacked on two separate fronts.  These two fronts 
are related, although their relationship is sometimes not clearly understood.  The first 
front is the new-classical policy analysis of Robert Lucas and others.  The second is the 
program of VARs initiated by Christopher Sims. 
  In the early 1970s, the early new classical school, especially as represented in the 
work of Lucas, attacked the logic of orthodox policy analysis.  Before Lucas, economists 
typically analyzed the economy and the policymaker as independent.  A policymaker 
who understood the economy (through a large macroeconometric model) could choose 
instrument settings and use the model to predict outcomes.  Lucas (1972, 1976) insisted 
that a sound analysis of policy required that the economy and the policymaker be seen as   4
interdependent.  The public based its behavior on its expectations of the policymaker’s 
actions derived from an understanding of the rules that the policymaker followed.  The 
rational-expectations hypothesis is a crisp implementation of the assumption that the 
public understands the implications of the policy rule.  The public is modeled as having 
expectations that are consistent with the outcomes that would be predicted by the model 
of the economy itself.  The policymaker cannot, then, model the public as being misled 
about the implications of systematic policies. 
  Lucas joined the rational-expectations hypothesis to the assumption of continuous 
market clearing and monetary neutrality to underwrite the “surprise-only” analysis of 
aggregate supply.  On this view, money has no effect except when the public mistakes 
neutral changes in the price level for economically significant changes in relative prices –
the rational-expectations hypothesis (Muth 1961) guarantees that such mistakes are short-
lived.   
  Lucas not only undermined the conviction that systematic policy could be useful, 
he provided a basis for dismissing the usefulness of the typical macroeconometric models 
of the day as engines of policy analysis.  The common practice circa 1970 was to use 
aggregative models with equations estimated conditionally on the existing monetary 
institutions and then to assume that the coefficients of the models remained constant as 
policymakers altered the values of monetary-policy variables and worked out their 
implications for GDP or other variables of interest.  The surprise-only aggregate-supply 
function implied that this was a useless strategy.  And Lucas predicted that one would 
find evidence of its uselessness in the instability of the coefficient estimates in   5
macroeconometric models:  as monetary regimes changed – that is, as the rules of 
systematic monetary policy changed – the coefficient estimates would also change.   
  The notion that changing the policy rule could not usefully affect real target 
variables became known as the policy-ineffectiveness proposition (Sargent and Wallace 
1975, 1976); while the conclusion that the coefficient estimates would change as policy 
regimes changed became known as the policy-noninvariance proposition or the Lucas 
critique.  Although the Lucas critique is sometimes seen to be an attack on a modeling 
strategy (without rational expectations, the macroeconometric modeler cannot get it 
right), Lucas’s point is not “if we only knew how the estimates would change, we could 
continue to use the old strategy of policy analysis.”  Rather, the point is that the estimates 
of the coefficients are merely shifting and useless correlations among macroeconomic 
aggregates.  The real attack on macromodels is the policy-ineffectiveness proposition, 
which implies that there is no point in getting it right anyway:  the surprise-only/rational-
expectations hypothesis already implies that no predictable policy could work.  Given 
policy ineffectiveness, the Lucas critique is a sideshow with respect to aggregate demand 
policies.   
  Over the past 25 years, the Lucas critique has become entrenched wisdom among 
macroeconomists.  In contrast, the foundations of the surprise-only analysis of aggregate 
supply have been attacked in various ways.  One approach challenges fundamental 
features of Lucas’s analysis – particularly, the rational-expectations hypothesis or rapid 
market clearing.  Lucas (1972) himself had pointed out that, if expectations were formed 
adaptively, systematic monetary policy would have real effects.  Fischer (1977), Phelps 
and Taylor (1977), Taylor (1979), and, more recently, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and   6
Rotemberg (1982, 1996), among others, have shown that if prices can adjust only slowly 
because of contracts or because of costs of adjustment, then systematic monetary policy, 
not just monetary surprises, will have real effects. 
  A second approach developed more slowly out of the new classical analysis itself.  
Initial empirical tests of Lucas’s analysis appeared to support the surprise-only 
hypothesis (Lucas, 1973; Barro, 1977, 1978).  Lucas (1973) himself realized that 
monetary surprises alone could not describe the serial correlation of output characteristic 
of the business cycle.  He hypothesized non-monetary mechanisms involving optimal 
investment and intertemporal substitution in labor supply that would propagate an initial 
monetary shock through time (Lucas 1975).  More detailed investigations of the 
monetary-surprise hypothesis, however, revealed anomalies (Barro and Rush, 1980 and 
Gordon, 1990, p. 1135).  Investigations of the stationarity of macroeconomic aggregates 
(Nelson and Plosser, 1982) convinced many macroeconomists that monetary shocks 
could not account for business cycles.  If money were neutral in the long-run it could not 
induce permanent changes in real variables.  Yet real output was, in fact, dominated by a 
non-stationary component, suggesting that real rather than monetary shocks were the 
cause of its movements.  Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) claim, that a business-cycle 
model with only real shocks better explained the data than a model with monetary 
shocks, bolstered this time-series result.  In one of the main streams of macroeconomic 
development, monetary policy came to be viewed as irrelevant.  The rational-
expectations hypothesis and the principle of the Lucas critique were nonetheless now 
entrenched.   7
  Sims (1980) criticized the orthodoxy of pre-1970s policy analysis along a second 
front.  A central problem in isolating the independent causes of changes in 
macroeconomic aggregates is that the data are highly intercorrelated.  The ideal of 
orthodox modelers was the strategy developed by the Cowles Commission in the late 
1940s and early 1950s (see Morgan, 1990; and Hendry and Morgan, 1995, parts IV and 
VII and the correlative sections of the introduction).  The hope was to isolate invariant 
(causal) structures using the implications of well-grounded economic theory to provide 
strong identifying restrictions.  In practice, identifying restrictions were often imposed 
without firm justification.  Sims (1980) played the honest boy gazing on the emperor of 
orthodox macroeconometric modeling, loudly declaring that he could see no clothes.  The 
usual identifying assumptions were literally “incredible” – neither derivable from 
economic theory nor plausible on other grounds. 
  Sims’s attack was not grounded in the new classical analysis or the Lucas critique, 
but was an independent criticism of the orthodox modeling.  Nonetheless, one reaction to 
the Lucas critique can be seen as an attempt to answer Sims as well – to provide credible 
identifying restrictions.  One way of dealing with coefficients that shift with changing 
monetary-policy regimes is to provide an accurate accounting of the actual behavior of 
the policymaker and the public in terms of the so-called “deep parameters” governing 
tastes and technology and economic constraints.  The idea is to provide a detailed, 
structural model of the economy grounded in individual decision-making.  Although this 
approach – at least in its representative-agent model form – dominates theoretical 
macroeconomics today, it has not been a notable empirical success.  It founders because 
it makes a giant, unwarranted leap in concluding that what might be captured in a model   8
of unique and differentiated individuals can be scaled up to an aggregate – the 
representative agent – that behaves just like one of the individuals, only on the scale of 
the whole economy.  The identifying assumptions derived on such a basis are just as 
incredible as any palmed off by “structural” econometric modelers even before the dawn 
of the new classical macroeconomics.
1 
  Sims’s alternative program eschewed identification and worked instead with 
unrestricted reduced-form equations – VARs.  Every variable in the VAR is regarded as 
endogenous.  Each variable in the vector of endogenous variables is regressed on lagged 
values of itself and of all of the other variables.  The VAR decomposes the observed 
variation in the economy into random errors and systematic responses.  Since the 
variables are all endogenous, the action in the economy is attributed to the random-error 
terms.  But Sims realized that these errors were not themselves exogenous as they were 
likely to be correlated with one another.  Several simple algebraic transformations of the 
VAR could provide decompositions in which the errors were no longer intercorrelated by 
construction.  Then policy analysis could concentrate on the transformed error terms.  
These are the exogenous “shocks.”  In the transformed system, one could easily trace out 
the endogenous responses to the exogenous shocks in impulse-response functions or 
quantify their influence in variance decompositions. 
  The difficulty with this strategy is that the orthogonalizing transformations are not 
unique, but form an observationally equivalent class.  But to choose one of the 
transformations from the equivalence class is to impose structure on the model.
2  Each 
                                                 
 
1 Hansen and Sargent (1980) provide a classic example of this strategy.  See Kirman (1992), Hartley 
(1997), and Hoover (2001a, Lecture 3) for criticism of the representative-agent assumption. 
2 The transformations are observationally equivalent in the sense that, having the same reduced form, they 
also have the same likelihood.  From the 1940s through the mid-1960s, whether systems of structural   9
transformation defines quantitatively different shocks and different responses of 
endogenous variables to the shocks.  The implications of a shock to monetary policy will 
generally be different depending on which transformation is chosen.  
  Noting the problem of observational equivalence, Cooley and LeRoy (1985) and 
Leamer (1985) argued that VARs were useful for policy analysis only to the degree that 
they were themselves structural.  Sims conceded the point, but only by degrees.  The key 
point in breaking down observational equivalence was to eliminate the correlation among 
the non-orthogonalized shocks.  This required structural assumptions only about the 
contemporaneous variables.  So-called “structural VARs” retain unrestricted lagged 
variables.
3  But even the contemporaneous order needs just as much justification as any 
other identifying assumption if it is not to be incredible.  Yet the arguments that typically 
support the presumed order are informal or even casual.  Credibility lies in the eye of the 
modeler.  
  The relationship of the program of VARs to the new classical macroeconomics 
was not completely worked out.  Impulse-response functions modeled monetary surprises 
in a manner analogous to Lucas’s surprise-only approach.  Sims (1982, 1986) defended 
the structural VAR approach from the Lucas critique with the argument that the practice 
of monetary policy is captured in stable (if possibly complicated) contingent rules that 
change only rarely.  Within any stable policy regime, the Lucas critique would not be an 
issue and concentrating on the response of the economy to shocks would be the 
appropriate strategy.   
                                                                                                                                                 
equations should be specified recursively or simultaneously was hotly debated (Wold 1960).  The debate 
fizzled when Robert Basmann (1965) demonstrated the observational equivalence of recursive and 
simultaneous systems. 
3 That is, unrestricted aside from the practical necessity of a finite number of lags.   10
  Most quantitative analysis of monetary policy is now conducted using VARs.  But 
should it be?  If Lucas was right in the first place, how does knowing the response of the 
economy to shocks help the policymaker when shocks cannot be systematically 
exploited?  We cannot help but think that some practitioners want to have it both ways: to 
have a method that is immune to the Lucas critique because its VARs are estimated over 
periods in which, in fact, there have been no regime changes and, at the same time, to 
formulate advice for systematic policy on the basis of the impulse-response functions of 
these VARs.
4 
  Recently policy analysis using VARs has moved past an exclusive focus on 
impulse-response functions and variance decomposition.  Observing that only a small 
amount of the variability of the target variables in the economy can be credited to the 
shocks in monetary instruments no matter how they are identified, several economists 
have sought to shift the focus to systematic policy rules.
5  For example, one might ask 
how  
much of the response of the economy to a non-monetary shock (e.g., to an oil-price 
shock) is direct and how much is induced by the response of monetary policy to the 
shock?   
  Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), for example, estimate a structural VAR and 
then trace out the impulse responses when the equation governing the monetary 
                                                 
4 See Cooley, LeRoy and Raymon (1984) and LeRoy (1995) for an argument that the practice is, in fact, 
legitimate.  Cf. Hoover (1988, ch. 8, section 4; 2001b, ch. 7, section 4). 
5 Some notable recent papers in this vein are Taylor (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), and McCallum (1999).  In the VARs reported in Section 5 below, 
the usual variance decomposition attributes between 0.8 percent and 31 percent of the variance at a one-
year horizon (depending on the estimation period) to the monetary shock.  Because the variance attributable 
to each of the shocks mixes the direct effect of the random shocks with the indirect effects of the 
deterministic structural elements of the VAR, these estimates form an upper bound on the real effects 
attributable to unsystematic monetary policy.     11
instrument is modified to follow the desired rule.  Sims (1999), in another example, 
imposes a structure that allows him to isolate the equations governing monetary policy in 
such a way that he believes he can legitimately transfer them from a VAR estimated on 
recent data to one estimated on data from before World War II.  He asks whether the 
economy of the 1920s and 1930s would have developed differently if monetary policy in 
the earlier period had followed the typical patterns of the later period.  Both examples are 
extensions that do not fundamentally change the structural-VAR framework.  But 
inconsistencies remain.  If Lucas’s earlier assessment of monetary policy analysis is 
correct, which appears to be the unstated assumption of the emphasis on shocks (see 
Sections 2 and 4 below), then the counterfactual experiments are pointless.  On the one 
hand, if the economy is really governed by a surprise-only aggregate-supply function and 
people have rational expectations, systematic policy, regardless of how it reacts to 
exogenous shocks, is ineffective.  On the other hand, if policy regimes change, then the 
structural VARs should be just as subject to the Lucas critique as earlier “structural”  
macroeconometric models. 
  Our goal is to take a step to deal with these inconsistencies, to assess monetary 
policy in a VAR framework in a way that accounts for (or, if appropriate, dismisses) 
Lucas’s analysis of policy.  Our approach is based on an empirical implementation of 
Cochrane’s (1998) structural interpretation of VARs.  A by-product of the exercise is a 
framework for a critical assessment of the ways VARs are used for policy analysis. 
   12
2. A taxonomy of monetary policy 
  2.1 The VAR and the structural VAR 
Monetary policy analysis involves at least two connected distinctions: systematic versus 
unsystematic policy and anticipated versus unanticipated policy.  To clarify the 
relationships among these distinctions and their role in policy analysis, we develop a 
stripped-down VAR model and relate it to an equally stripped down macromodel. 
  We begin with the VAR.  Two variables, which we think of as output (yt) and 
money (mt) depend on the histories of both variables and on random errors  t ?¢ =  
(wyt, wmt ).  For simplicity, we consider only one lag of the variables: 
 
        yt = qyyyt-1 +  qymmt-1 + wyt        (1) 
 
        mt = qmyyt-1 +  qmmmt-1 + wmt        (2) 
 
The covariance matrix of these errors is: 
 






) var( ) , cov(




w w w         (3) 
 
  Since there is no reason to believe that the error terms in equations (1) and (2) are 
not correlated, the off-diagonal terms are in general not zero.  This poses a problem for 
policy analysis since it implies that we cannot distinguish the shocks:  to a shock, say, the 
money equation would in general be associated with a correlated shock to the output   13
equation.  A properly transformed system, however, would fit the data equally well and 
have independent error terms.  For example, multiply equation (2) by  
m = cov(wyt, wmt)/var(wmt) and subtract it from equation (1) to yield: 
 
        yt t t t t y m m y x + P + P + P = - - 1 2 1 1 0       (4) 
 
where  
          m = P0            (4a) 
          mm yy mq q - = P1         (4b) 
          mm ym mf f - = P2         (4c) 
          mt yt yt mw w x - =         (4d) 
 
Equations (2) and (4) constitute a transformed model for which the random-error terms 
t ?¢= (xyt, wmt), are no longer correlated: 
 







0 ) var( ) , cov( 2 ) var(
2
mt
mt mt yt yt
w
w m w w w     (5) 
 
This transformation is the bivariate version of the Choleski factorization.  It is 
characterized by the transformation of the variance-covariance matrix into a diagonal 
form and by the recursive structure of the contemporaneous variables known as the Wold 
causal order.  Money is causally ordered ahead of output because mt appears in equation   14
(4) and helps to determine yt, whereas yt does not appear in equation (2).  The lack of 
correlation between the random-error terms in the transformed system means that each 
equation may be shocked independently.  The Wold causal order means that shocks to 
money transmit immediately to output, but shocks to output transmit to money only with 
a lag. 
  Unfortunately the Choleski factorization is not unique.  If instead we had 
multiplied equation (1) by d = cov(wyt, wmt)/var(wyt) and subtracted it from equation (2), 
we would have ended up with a system with a diagonal variance-covariance matrix, albeit 
with different error terms, and a Wold causal order in which output was ordered ahead of 
money.  This is the problem of observational equivalence. 
  The VAR set-up here is easily generalized to longer lags and more variables.  
Higher dimensional VARs will have as many Choleski factorizations as there are 
permutations of the variables.  Furthermore, the restrictions that diagonalize the variance-
covariance matrix need not be Choleski, and the equations of the transformed model need 
not be strictly recursive.  The rule is that the system is identified so long as there are at 
least as many restrictions as the number that would be imposed by a Choleski 
decomposition, that is, n(n – 1)/2.  When the modeler claims that the particular order of 
the contemporaneous variables is the true one, the model is known as a structural VAR.
6 
If the claim is warranted, then we have the pleasant result of having isolated the true 
independent shocks to the variables.  When it is unwarranted, the shocks – even though 
uncorrelated by construction – are linear combinations of the true shocks. 
                                                 
6 In the simple two-variable example, there are just two Choleski orderings and one further overidentified 
ordering in which the contemporaneous value of neither variable appears in the two equations (i.e., the 
ordinary VAR turns out to be the structural VAR).  In larger systems, even when just identified or 
overidentified, there may be blocks of simultaneous equations.   15
  The word “structural” here refers only to the relatively weak notion of an ordering 
of contemporaneous variables.  The lagged variables remain unordered (and, in a 
commonsense usage, nonstructural).  Yet, “structural VAR” in this sense has become 
cast-iron idiom.  We will distinguish between structural VARs and structural 
macroeconomic (or macroeconometric) models in which the invariant parameters are 
identified. 
  Each shock to the VAR system has several effects:  (i) a direct effect on the 
current value of the dependent variable in its own equation; (ii) an effect mediated 
through that variable on any equation lower in the causal order; and (iii) an infinite 
sequence of effects on the future values of both variables, since the values of today 
become the lagged values of tomorrow.  The impulse-response function for the system of 
equations (2) and (4) captures the net result of all three effects.  It is calculated by 
repeatedly substituting the lagged values of one equation into the other to eliminate the 
variables, leaving only the error terms going infinitely far back.  This is the moving-
average representation of the system.  Although in principle, the moving-average 
representation involves infinitely many shock terms, it is, in practice, truncated to some 
finite number.  Typically, the impulse-response function is represented by a graph of the 
effect of a single-period unit shock on one of the variables, over time.  In principle, 
impulse-response functions are not invariant to the causal order of the structural VAR, so 
that getting the causal order correct is critical. 
   16
  2.2 The structural macroeconometric model 
  We begin the exposition of the structural macroeconometric model with a 
textbook Lucasian model.  Output measured as a deviation from the mean is governed by 
a surprise-only aggregate-supply curve in which output at time t (yt) depends on the 
deviation of prices (pt) from prices that were expected at t – 1 to hold at t (
e
t p ): 
 
yt = a(pt – 
e
t p ) + eyt,  (6) 
 
where eyt is a white-noise error term, and all variables are expressed in logarithms.  
Aggregate demand is assumed for convenience to be governed by a quantity equation 
with velocity normalized to unity: 
 
pt = mt – yt,  (7) 
 
where mt is the money stock, which is assumed to be in the control of the monetary 
authorities and governed by a monetary-policy rule (or reaction function): 
 
mt = g1mt-1 + g2yt-1 + emt,  (8) 
 
where emt is a white-noise error term independent of eyt.  This policy rule is a feedback 
rule that allows the monetary authorities to react to the state of the real economy, as well 
as to past values of the money stock.  The model is closed by assuming that price   17
expectations are formed rationally on the basis of all the information available up to time 
t – 1 (Wt-1): 
 
e
t p  = E(pt|Wt-1).  (9) 
 
The distinction between systematic and unsystematic monetary policy refers to the 
policymaker.  In the reaction function, equation (8), systematic policy is characterized by 
the choice of policy parameters, g1 and g2; while unsystematic policy is characterized by 
the error term, em t.  The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated monetary 
policy refers to the public.  In equation (6), a policy is unanticipated if it delivers a non-
zero price surprise (pt – 
e
t p  „ 0); it is anticipated if it delivers no price surprise (pt – 
e
t p  = 
0).   
  The two distinctions can be thought of as forming a two-by-two matrix as in 
Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1.  A Taxonomy of Monetary Policy 
    Policymaker 




Anticipated  Known policy-reaction function.  Credible announcement of a 




Unanticipated  Surprise change to new known 
policy-reaction function. 




Each cell provides an example of the type of policy that exemplifies it.  The fact that the 
cells along the main diagonal illustrate the most common monetary-policy actions   18
explains the frequent equivocation between systematic and anticipated policies, on the 
one hand, and unsystematic and unanticipated policies, on the other.  Policies are usually 
paired in those ways.  Yet, surprisingly, neither of the off-diagonal cells is empty.  One 
might think at first blush that unsystematic monetary policy could not be anticipated.  
Yet, if we regard the systematic elements of the reaction function as capturing what the 
monetary authorities typically do, we can imagine a transitory policy action which is both 
atypical – and, therefore, unsystematic – and yet widely expected.  Past and future 
Federal Reserve behavior, for example, may in the current circumstances point to a ¼ 
point rise in the Federal funds rate; yet the Federal Reserve may raise rates ½ point, as 
might have been widely expected, thus causing no surprise.  The injection of liquidity in 
anticipation of the so-called “Y2K” demand may provide a less generic example.  We can 
distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated policy according to whether the policy 
is fully captured in Wt-1.  If a transitory policy were captured in em t, but em t was in fact 
effectively an element of Wt-1, there would be no price surprise in equation (6). 
  The usual solution to a model such as that in equations (6) through (9) presumes 
that only information dated at t – 1 or before can be part of the information set, Wt-1.  On 
that assumption, the model can be solved for y: 
 
( ) yt t t t t y m m y e ag ag a
a











Despite the apparent influence of m over y, systematic policy is ineffective.  To see this, 
substitute equation (8) into (10), to yield: 
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Only the real shock to aggregate supply and emt, the unsystematic part of monetary 
policy, and not the systematic part (governed by g1 and g2) matters.   
  Equations (8) and (10) can be regarded as a structural VAR with m  
(Wold-)causally ordered ahead of y.  Equation (11) can be regarded as a (degenerate) 
form of the moving-average representation of this VAR.  The impulse-response function 
for y to a unit monetary shock follows from equation (11) and takes the value (1 + a)
-1 at 
period t, and zero thereafter.  In this case, it is easy to see that the usual method assumes 
the monetary-policy action is both unsystematic and unanticipated.  This case illustrates 
the policy-ineffectiveness proposition. 
  Contrast this to the case in which the monetary-policy action is unsystematic and 
anticipated.  As we already noted, an unsystematic, anticipated policy is equivalent to Wt-1 
including emt.  When emt is not known at t – 1, the rational expectation of mt is 
1 2 1 1 - - + t t y m g g ; but, when emt is known at t – 1, it is simply mt.  An easy way to derive the 
consequence for y of an anticipated, unsystematic policy is to replace  1 2 1 1 - - + t t y m g g  with 
mt in equation (10) to yield: 
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The impulse response to an unsystematic shock to monetary policy is now zero for all 
current and future times because the impulse is itself eliminated (that is, 
e
t t p p -  = 0). 
 
  2.3 Mapping between the structural macroeconometric model and the 
structural VAR. 
 
  Turning to systematic policy, notice that an econometrician typically would not 
estimate a regression of the form of equation (10).  Rather he would estimate something 
like equation (4).  The coefficients of equation (4) can be related to the parameters of the 
structural macroeconomic model: 
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If equations (6)–(9) are the true model, then the two sets of equations (4a)–(4d) and 
(4a’)–(4d’) together provide a mapping between the true underlying parameters of the 
structural macroeconomic model and the reduced-form coefficients of the ordinary VAR. 
Given the ethos of the structural VAR program, the assumption one knows that equations 
(6)-(9) are the true model is too strong to be believed. Yet, without this assumption, the   21
constituent parameters (a, g1, g2) cannot be identified separately.
7  A change in systematic 
policy, a change in the value of g1 or g2, will change the value of one or more of the Pi’s.  
This is the Lucas critique:  the estimated macroeconometric relationship is not invariant 
to changes in systematic policy.  Such a policy change, however, could have a real effect 
only to the degree that it was unanticipated.  If the change were credibly announced in 
advance, then like other anticipated policies it would have no effect.  If it were sprung on 
the public by surprise, it would act like an unanticipated shock until it was incorporated 
into the public’s expectations (see the lower left-hand cell of  
Table 1). 
  The Lucas critique might appear to threaten the usefulness of the VAR 
methodology in the case of changing monetary regimes - since every shift of systematic 
policy would alter not only the monetary-policy equation (equation (8)) but also the rest  
of the system (here equation (4) with the coefficients defined by (4a’)-(4d’)).  While it is 
true that the coefficients (the Pi’s) will change (that is, the structural VAR is non-
invariant), both equations (11) and (10’) (the moving-average representation of the 
structural VAR) are invariant to the policy regime.  They depend only on the parameter 
a, which is not a parameter of the policy-reaction function.  The invariance of the 
moving-average representations implies that the impulse-response functions are 
themselves invariant.  The VAR is immune to the Lucas critique not because regimes do 
not in fact change but because of the assumptions that real variables respond only to 
monetary surprises and that expectations are rational.  Since equation (11) is drawn from 
a transformation of the structural VAR, the invariance result depends on having the 
                                                 
7 If we are willing to assume the truth of the model, then g1 = P1/P2, a = (1 + P0)
-1, etc.   22
correct structural VAR.  Getting the right causal structure of the contemporaneous 
variables is, therefore, crucial. 
 
3. Rule-of-thumb and partial rational models 
Although it is not often remarked, the manner in which VARs are usually evaluated 
makes sense on the assumption that Lucas’s analysis of monetary policy is correct.  What 
is more, only the case of unsystematic, unanticipated monetary policy is typically 
analyzed.  This is the case of the policy-ineffectiveness proposition in full force.  An 
older tradition saw monetary policy as having real effects, either because expectations 
were not formed rationally or because prices did not move quickly to clear markets.  To 
incorporate this view into the model of the last section, we could replace equation (9) 
with an adaptive-expectation scheme.  This would be analogous to Lucas’s non-natural 
rate model, the foil for the rational-expectations model of his 1972 paper.  Or we could 
add a price adjustment equation, which is the approach implicit in the overlapping 
contract models and explicit in the models of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Rotemberg 
(1982, 1996), among others.  A less specific approach would be to model anticipated 
monetary policy more simply as directly affecting output.  Instead of equation (6), 
aggregate supply is modeled as 
 
yt = bmt + eyt.  (12) 
 
Now equations (8) and (12) form a structural VAR.  In the new system, the distinction 
between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy is moot – both have an identical   23
effect on y.  Similarly, the Lucas critique is inapplicable since equation (12) indicates that 
expectations are not an element in people’s supply responses. 
  The two systems (equations (8) and (10) and equations (8) and (12)) represent 
extreme cases.  Cochrane (1998) considers an intermediate case in which there are two 
types of agents in the economy:  Lucasian agents, who have rational expectations and act 
according to equations (6) and (9), and those who do not have rational expectations and 
act according to equation (12).  Following his conjecture in a simplified case, we 
characterize an economy with both types as a simple mixture of equations (6) and (12), 
where l is the mixing parameter: 
 
yt = lbmt + (1 – l)a(pt – 
e
t p ) + eyt.  (13) 
 
Intuitively, we can regard (1 – l) as the proportion of people in the economy who form 
rational expectations and l as the proportion who follow a rule of thumb.
8  But this is not 
quite right since those forming rational expectations would rationally take account of the 
responses of those who follow a rule of thumb, so that l would properly correspond to 
the proportions of the two groups only if they lived on separate islands.  It may 
nonetheless satisfactorily capture the relative importance of their behaviors (if not their 
numbers) and, when properly selected, may adequately account for the properties of the 
impulse-response functions of the estimated VAR.
9 
                                                 
8 This is similar to Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) consumption function in which one part of the 
population follows the permanent-income hypothesis and another part follows a rule of thumb. 
9 The interaction in which the rational agents take account of the responses of the non-rational agents is part 
of Haltiwanger and Waldman’s (1989) analysis.  In work on the consumption function, Haase (1998) 
demonstrates that the likely difference between a proper analysis of the interaction and a pure mixing   24
  The complete model consists, then, of equations (7), (8), (9), and (13).  The new 
system is given by the solution for y (equation 14) and the policy rule in equation (8), 
namely, 
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mt = g1mt-1 + g2yt-1 + emt.  (8) 
 
When l = 1, equation (14) reduces to equation (12); and when l = 0, it reduces to 
equation (10).  In general, when 0 < l < 1, equations (8) and (14) form a structural VAR.   
  Because of the interaction between agents with rational expectations and those for 
whom the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy is 
meaningless, the Lucas critique has real bite, except in the two extreme cases.  Not only  
are the estimates of the structural equations (8) and (14) not invariant, the responses of y 
to monetary impulses are complicated functions of the mixing parameter, l, as well as the 
policy parameters, g1 and g2.  What is worse for purposes of empirical analysis is that, in a 
single regime (that is, for a particular setting of the policy parameters), l is not identified 
and cannot be estimated directly.  The inability to measure l renders Cochrane’s analysis 
critical rather than empirical.  Cochrane (1998) illustrates the consequences of different  
                                                                                                                                                 
process is likely to be small, so that in this case l is probably very close to the actual proportion of the 
population that does not exhibit rational-expectations/surprise-only aggregate supply behavior.   25
assumptions about the value of l but provides no means of getting an empirical handle  
on it. 
  To make some headway, notice that, when policy is anticipated and we can, 
therefore, replace  1 2 1 1 - - + t t y m g g  with mt equation (14) reduces to  
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Equation (15) is invariant to monetary-policy regime but depends on the mixing 
parameter, l.  If we assume that l is itself invariant to regime changes as seems 
reasonable, then regime changes themselves can be used to identify l.  Intuitively, the 
identification strategy works like this:  A structural VAR (analogous to equations (8) and 
(14)) is estimated in two or more regimes.  In general, the impulse-response functions can 
be worked out from the moving-average representation of the structural VAR only if we 
assume a value for l; and, thus, the impulse-response functions will be different for every 
different l.  But since, according to equation (15), the impulse response to an anticipated 
monetary shock should be identical across regimes, we search for that value of l that 
delivers the required identity.  The details of our implementation strategy are set out in 
the next section. 
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4. Measurement strategy 
 
  4.1 Deeper structures 
The model of the last section was simplified to illuminate the taxonomy of monetary 
policy more clearly.  To carry the strategy just sketched to the data, we need a more 
complicated model.  Closely following Cochrane (1998), we generalize the model in two 
ways:  first, we allow interactions with a set of macroeconomic variables orthogonal to 
the monetary shocks; second, we allow for the richer dynamics characteristic of the VAR 
approach. The final setup is designed to accommodate any macroeconomic model that 
can be well represented empirically by a VAR. 
  The main focus of our approach is Cochrane's (1998) equation (8), reproduced 
here with a slight change of notation as 
 
[ ] wt t t t t t L m E m m L A y e ) ( ) | ( )( 1 ( ) ( 1 B + W - - + = - l l   (16) 
 
where yt denotes an output measure that belongs to a vector of non-monetary variables w, 
mt denotes a monetary-policy indicator, E(.|.) is the conditional expectations operator, Wt-
1 is the information available at time t – 1, and ewt is a vector of orthogonalized, non-
monetary innovations (which include the output innovation itself).  The term A(L) is a 
polynomial in the lag operator L (e.g., L
axt = xt-a).  B(L) is polynomial vector in the lag 
operator.  The parameter l takes values between 0 and 1.  
  Equation (13) is a particular case of equation (16).   Equations (7) and (9) can be 
used to eliminate the term  ) (
e
t t p p -  in equation (13) replacing it with the term   27
) (
e
t t m m - .  Equation (13) has no intrinsic dynamics.  The dynamics of the system of 
equations (7)-(9) and (13) come entirely from the dynamics of the monetary-policy rule 
(equation (8)).  In contrast, the lag structure A(L) provides equation (16) with its own 
dynamics.  The parameters a and b in equation (13) are subsumed in A(L).  The form of 
the equation reflects a conception of the influence of monetary policy in which either an 
anticipated shock (lmt) or an unanticipated shock ((1 - l) ) (
e
t t m m - ) is propagated by 
exactly the same mechanism: A(L).  Non-monetary impulses propagate according to their 
own mechanism: B(L).  Note that, although we have been drawing a parallelism between 
equation (13) and equation (16), the latter is silent with regard to the causal structure of 
the underlying model (despite the presence of the term lmt).  It is a general expression 
that does not restrict the modeler's choice of structural identification assumptions in any 
way. This point is made transparent in the derivation of equation (20) below.  
Equation (16) can be rewritten as 
 
[ ] wt t t t t t t L m E m L A m E L A y e ) ( ) | ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( 1 1 B + W - + W = - - l   (17) 
 
which makes its economic interpretation easier.  The term lA(L) describes the dynamic 
response of output to anticipated monetary policy, E(mt|Wt-1).  In a Lucasian economy in 
which everyone has rational expectations, l = 0 and the first term of the right-hand side 
of equation (17) vanishes.  The term A(L) describes the dynamic response to 
unanticipated monetary policy (mt – E(mt|Wt-1)). 
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Equation (16) captures the spirit of early aggregate new classical models.  Yet, it 
falls short of the quest initiated with Lucas’s (1976a) “critique” for a model grounded in 
tastes and technology – a true microfoundational model.  That quest, we believe, is 
quixotic.  Either it is hopelessly intractable – theoretically and empirically – if one seeks 
to model millions of individuals, or it is of dubious empirical relevance if one falls back 
on the representative-agent (or even agents) assumption.  To bring the representative-
agent model to aggregate data in the form of maintained identifying assumptions is to 
impose restrictions that implicitly claim that the aggregates behave as if they were 
governed by an individual scaled-up to the size of the economy.  Such a claim beggars 
belief; it is far more incredible than anything assumed by the macroeconometric modelers 
of the 1960s.
10 
  We believe that the Lucas critique can be dealt with only pragmatically.  We 
cannot seek invariance at the deepest microfoundational level, but we must rather seek 
relative invariance a level or two below the aggregate macroeconomic phenomena.  The 
parameters of a structural VAR are, we believe, unlikely to be invariant.  Through some 
plausible, but by no means certain, assumptions, we hope to account for the most 
important causes of noninvariance.  The only test of our assumptions is whether or not 
they appear to succeed in practice. 
  Cochrane (1998) also considers a model of costly price adjustment due to 
Rotemberg (1982, 1996). There can be other possibly more realistic models as well.  We 
prefer the model of equation (16) to the Rotemberg model or any of the alternatives since 
it makes relatively weaker (coarser) restrictions.  There is a vast number of alternative 
                                                 
10 See Hoover (2001a) for a critical account of the methodological foundation of the quest for 
microfoundations.   29
models of sticky price adjustment or models using differing non rational-expectations 
schemes of expectations formation in which the fine details are likely to matter.  The fact 
that in equations (16) and (17) the anticipated/unanticipated monetary policy distinction 
is summarized in the single parameter, l, is a virtue. 
  The key steps in our strategy of identification are to establish the links between 
equation (16) and the structural moving average representation of wt.  One would first 
estimate the structural VAR (with the presumed-correct causal order) and then invert it to 
obtain 
 
wt yw mt ym t L L C y e ) ( ) ( C + = e   (18) 
 
where emt is the structural monetary innovation and ewt is as defined above.
11 The term 
Cym(L) is an infinite polynomial, while Cyw(L) is an infinite polynomial vector in the lag 
operator.  Each of their elements, ci,j,k, associates movements of variable i to a shock in 
variable j that took place k periods ago.  Note that, because equation (18) is a moving-
average representation derived from a structural VAR, the terms ci,j,0 are in general non-
zero for i „ j.  The typical Wold causal orderings that result from Choleski factorizations 
impose the condition ci,j,0 = 0 for all i > j.  The observationally equivalent class is then 
defined by the permutations of the variables indexed by i and j.  Similarly, the moving 
average representation of mt is,  
 
                                                 
11 Equation (18) is one row of the inverted structural VAR.  Other variables are represented mutatis 
mutandis by other rows.  The derivations that follow do not require that we make specific distinction 
among the elements of ewt , mainly the output shock and any other non-monetary shocks.   30
wt mw mt mm t L L C m e ) ( ) ( C + = e   (19) 
 
Equating terms in expressions (17), (18) and (19), we have 
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so that in general 
 




) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( L L L A L mw yw B C C + =l   (22) 
 
  In a Lucasian economy, for which l = 0, only the unanticipated component of 
monetary policy has real effects resulting in, 
 
0 ) ( ) ( mm ym c L A L C =   (23) 
 
The factor cmm0 appears as a normalization that sets the 0
th order coefficient on mt in the 
money equation of the VAR representation to its conventional value of unity.  Equation   31
(23) says that the structural coefficients A(L) correspond to those of the usual impulse-
response function of output to an orthogonalized monetary shock.  Also note that l = 0 
implies Cyw(L) = B(L), that is, the response of output to each non-monetary shock 
characterized in the structural model by the elements of the polynomial vector B(L), 
correspond to the usual collection of impulse-response functions in Cyw(L).  In this 
Lucasian case, the monetary shock is all there is to the influence of monetary policy:  it 
starts a dynamic process going but has no further effect. 
  The fact that the impulse-response functions for the structural macroeconometric 
model in the Lucasian case of l = 0 correspond to the usual impulse response functions 
from the structural VAR highlights a point only infrequently acknowledged:  the usual 
methods of assessing the implications of structural VARs implicitly assume Lucas’s 
surprise-only economy.  Looking at the other extreme case in which l = 1 demonstrates 
how misleading this can be.  When l = 1, the equivalent to equation (23) is 
 




) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( L L L A L mw yw B C C + =   (25) 
 
This corresponds to a traditional (pre-Lucas) structural macroeconometric model in 
which coefficients of the VAR representation are invariant structural parameters.  Here, 
in contrast to the Lucasian case, a monetary shock has a direct effect as in the Lucasian   32
case and an indirect feedback effect in which the monetary-policy-reaction function 
captured in equation (19) systematically affects real variables (indicated by the terms in 
square brackets on the right-hand side of equation (20)). 
  In the intermediate case in which l „ 0, some people react to anticipated 
monetary policy and some with rational expectations integrate the behavior of these rule-
of-thumb agents into their own expectations, equations (21) and (22) themselves are the 
equivalent to (23).  In this case, the conventional impulse response of output to a shock to 
a variable other than money or output (Cyw(L)) can be decomposed:  the direct effect is 
measured by the polynomial vector B(L), and the effect of the endogenous response of 
the monetary authority is measured by the polynomial vector lA(L)Cmw(L).  
  Equations (21) and (22) yield a set of conditions that govern the correspondence 
between the coefficients of the estimated impulse-response functions, derived from the 
moving-average representation of the VAR (Cij(L)) and the structural parameters (l, 
A(L), and B(L)).  These conditions are 
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In principle, there is an infinity of such conditions; in practice, they would be truncated at 
some arbitrary k = K.  Then, for any given value of l between 0 and 1, one can compute 
the terms ak and bik for i ˛ w and, k = 0,1,2,..., although l itself cannot be separately 
identified from the set (26). 
 
  4.2 Identification Strategy 
  Since l measures the relative importance of output responses to anticipated 
policy, one might quibble that more transparent and, therefore, more accurately 
anticipated operating procedures for monetary policy might affect the value of l.  These 
concerns are probably secondary.  In 1994, the Federal Reserve began announcing the 
policy actions of the Federal Open Market Committee immediately after its meetings.  
Demiralp and Jordá (2000) provide evidence that financial markets already anticipated   34
Federal Reserve policies reasonably accurately even in the period in which the actions 
were meant to be secret.  
  Although it is natural to assume that the response of output to a monetary 
impulse, A(L), or to non-monetary shocks, B(L), would remain invariant across policy 
regimes, one cannot rule out other sources of parameter instability unrelated to monetary 
policy.  Such instability is a matter of econometric specification and, unlike the instability 
highlighted by the Lucas critique, not a matter of endogenous economic behavior.  In any 
case, the assumption of the invariance of these dynamic structures is no stronger than the 
invariance assumptions typical in the literature on structural VARs. 
  Starting with the identifying assumptions, we must first identify distinct monetary 
policy regimes.  Let t = 1, 2, ..., T index the sample period of a time series.  Let T1, ..., TH 
denote the dates that partition the sample into H + 1 distinct regimes corresponding to the 
subsamples t = Th-1 +1, ..., Th for h = 1, ..., H.  (By convention T0 = 0.)  Practically, the 
smallest of these subsamples must afford adequate degrees of freedom to estimate a 
monetary VAR, the specification of which is common to all subsamples but the 
parameters of which are estimated within each subsample.  In practice, the VAR would 
contain the variables yt and mt, along with the other variables in the vector wt that are 
customarily included in monetary VARs. To simplify the notation and the exposition in 
the derivations below, we shall treat the VAR as including only y and m.  It is 
straightforward to generalize our results to higher order systems.
12   
  Estimates of each subsample VAR produce a set of impulse-response functions 
similar to those in expressions (18) and (19), namely 
                                                 
12 Although the notation is meant to suggest output and money as the variables, in Section 5 below, y shall 
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and consequently, H + 1 sets of conditions similar to those in expression (26).  To solve 
for the parameters of interest l, ak and bik for k = 0,1, ..., K consider solving the system of 
K · 2 equations implied by our subsample estimates.  In particular, define Cy = [Cym0, ..., 
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That is, the vector Cy collects the H + 1 estimates for each of the K · 2 right-hand side 
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Rewriting expression (26) in terms of the auxiliary definitions (28)-(30) we have, 
 
v Wß C + = y   (31) 
 
Equation (31) represents a system of K · 2 equations based on a sample of size h + 1, 
where the parameter vector b' = [b1, ..., bK, ..., bK·2]  contains a high number of cross 
equations restrictions implied by the relations in equation (26) and where v represents the 
vector of computational error terms for a given b.  For example, the subvectors bk' = [ak, 
lak-1 , ..., la0 , 0, ..., 0] for k = 1, ..., K, and bk' = [lak, lak-1 , ..., la0 , 0, ..., bky] for k = K 
+ 1, ...,  K · 2.  In order to calculate the b that satisfies equation (31) one would want to 
minimize the terms in v with some sensible loss function.  A natural candidate is the 
minimized sum of the squared deviations, which converts the problem of calculating the 
parameters b in equation (31) into one of estimating a panel of K · 2 equations over H+1 
periods with cross-equation restrictions.    37
  To summarize our empirical strategy:  first, locate the structural breaks in the 
monetary-policy equation; second, estimate a structural VAR for each subsample; third, 
use these VARs to retrieve the coefficients of the moving-average representations of the 
VARs (equation (27)); fourth, use these in equation (31) to estimate jointly the aks, biks 
and l (explicit in equation (26)); finally, having recovered an identified structural model 
from the unidentified structural VAR, we are in a position to conduct quantified policy 
analysis. 
 
5. Recovery of the Structural Model 
  5.1 The Structural VAR 
We draw on the extensive literature on the analysis of monetary policy using linear 
VARs.  We considered specifications based on monthly data that would afford a 
sufficiently large sample.  Even though we believe that there are serious questions about 
the cogency of the arguments used to justify the identification of the causal ordering of 
the structural VAR and the typical, albeit not universal, assumption of a Choleski 
factorization, we want a specification with an established tradition in the literature to 
avoid lengthy discussions regarding variable choice and structural identification 
assumptions, which would distract the reader from the main focus of this paper.  We hope 
to revisit this issue in later work.  From the available alternatives, we chose the the 
system originally proposed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and slightly   38
modified and used inter alia by Evans and Marshall (1998) and Hamilton and Jordá 
(2000).
13   
  Our data sample runs from January 1960 to January 1999.  The data vector is 
given by S = [EM, P, PCOM, FF, NBRX, DM2]', where EM denotes the logarithm of 
non-agricultural payroll employment; P denotes the logarithm of the personal 
consumption expenditures deflator (1996 = 100); PCOM denotes the annual growth rate 
of the index of sensitive materials prices issued by the Conference Board; FF denotes the 
Federal funds rate; NBRX denotes the ratio of nonborrowed reserves plus extended credit 
to total reserves; and DM2 denotes the annual growth rate of the monetary aggregate M2.  
Data are seasonally adjusted.  All logged data are multiplied by 100 so that impulse 
responses can be interpreted directly as percent deviations.  The inclusion of the variable 
PCOM has now become customary in monetary VARs to mitigate the anomalous 
responses of the price-level to monetary-policy shocks (the so-called "price puzzle" 
described in Sims, 1992, and Eichenbaum, 1992).  The contemporaneous variables are 
causally ordered through a Choleski factorization in which the Wold causal order is the 
order in which the variables are written in the vector S.  To conserve parsimony and 
degrees of freedom, we experimented with several lag length specifications.  A lag length 
of 4 seemed adequate (for example, the Durbin-Watson statistic for the FF equation had a 
value of 2.0267) to capture the dynamic properties of our problem. 
 
                                                 
13 The slight modifications consist of using log employment rather than the log real gross domestic product, 
the log personal-consumption-expenditure deflator rather than the log GDP price deflator, the ratio of 
nonborrowed reserves to total reserves rather than log nonborrowed reserves.   39
  5.2 Monetary Policy Regimes 
In the analysis that follows, employment (EM) will be regarded as the real output 
measure (y in our theoretical exposition) and the federal funds rate (FF) as our monetary-
policy instrument (m in the theoretical exposition). 
  The first task required by our methodology is to identify dates of monetary policy 
regime shifts.  Detailed institutional accounts can be found inter alia in Meulendyke 
(1998) and Strongin (1995).  That the period from October 1979 to October 1982 is a 
monetary-policy regime distinct from what came before or after is, perhaps, the most 
commonly agreed fact about monetary policy regimes in the United States.  This regime 
targeted nonborrowed reserves, while the immediately preceding and following regimes 
essentially targeted interest rates.  The dates October 1979 to October 1982 are frequently 
identified by purely statistical methods as structural breaks in short-term nominal interest 
rates (see, for example, Garcia and Perron, 1996, and the references therein).  There is, 
however, considerably less agreement with regard to the dates of other regimes. 
  We rely on a combination of institutional knowledge and the sup F tests for 
structural breaks at unknown dates due to Bai and Perron (1998).
14  These tests are a 
generalization of the well-known test of Andrews (1993).  In particular, we test the 
policy-reaction equation of the VAR described in the previous section in its structural 
form, namely 
 
1 ,..., 1      ' + = + = H h u FF t h t t ß G   (32) 
   40
where Gt' includes a constant; up to four lags of the vector S described in the previous 
subsection, and the contemporaneous values of EM, P, PCOM.  The index h refers to the 
number of breaks which delivers H + 1 possible regimes.  We allow for the possibility 
that all of the coefficients, and not just the intercept, may change. 
  The first stage of the test requires that we calculate the unknown break dates Th,  
h = 1, ..., H along with the unknown coefficients bh .  The method suggested by Bai and 
Perron (1998) requires that we specify a maximum number of possible break points 
(which we set at eight, corresponding to at most nine distinct regimes) as well as a 
minimum size partition t such that Th – Th-1 > tT.  We choose t = 10%, constraining the 
minimum subsample size to 46 observations (this choice afforded a reasonable number of 
degrees of freedom for estimation of equation (32)).  
  It is important to highlight this particular feature because it conditions the 
candidate dates for possible breaks.  In particular, the beginning and end of the 
nonborrowed-reserve-targeting regime (October 1979 to October 1982) are separated by 
fewer than 46 observations and therefore, the regime does not afford the minimum 
number of observations needed for computation.  As we shall see, however, this did not 
constitute a significant impediment.  The test detected breaks at June 1978 and at April 
1982 which are separated by exactly the minimum 46 observations and bracket a period 
that includes nearly all of the nonborrowed reserves targeting period. 
  The method of estimation is based on the least-squares principle.  For each h 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 We thank Jushan Bai for generously providing us with the code used in this paper to run the structural 
break tests.   41
partition (T1, ..., TH), the associated least-squares estimates for bh  are obtained by  
minimizing the sum of squared residuals 
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Denote the resulting sum of squared residuals ST (T1, ..., TH), and the estimated break 
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where the minimization is taken over all partitions (T1, ..., TH) such that Th – Th-1 > tT.
15  
  Once the break dates have been estimated for the different values of H, we apply 
the sup F test of the null of no structural breaks (H = 0) versus the alternative hypothesis 
that there are H (for H = 1, 2, ..., 8) breaks as well as the sup F of the null that there are H 
+ 1 structural breaks versus the alternative of H breaks.  The F test consists essentially of 
the appropriately normalized ratio of the sum of squared residuals under the null to the 
sum of squared residuals under the alternative hypothesis.
16  The tests are flexible enough 
that they permit lagged dependent variables as regressors as long as the residuals are 
serially uncorrelated.
17  Table 2 summarizes the results of the test. 
 
                                                 
15 The algorithm used to compute expression (16) is discussed in Bai and Perron (1996). 
16 The specific form of these tests is described in section 4, Bai and Perron (1998). 
17 Recall the Durbin-Watson statistic for the FF equation is 2.0267.   42
Table 2.  Structural Break Tests of the Monetary-Policy Equation 
Number of breaks 
under the alternative, H 
sup F(H|0)  5% Critical 
value 
sup F(H+1|H)  5% Critical 
value 
AIC  BIC 
1    106.59  64.69  -  -  0.2320  0.3027 
2    125.92  58.56  119.92  68.12  0.1318  0.2244 
3    117.20  55.52  96.80  70.21  0.1254  0.2785 
4    106.32  53.16  96.80  71.09  0.1222  0.3540 
5    123.22  50.93  90.20  71.84  0.1178  0.4452 
6    124.74  48.77  70.62  72.59  0.1193  0.5882 
7    102.92  46.29  46.76  73.83  0.1267  0.8151 
8    88.84  42.83  52.22  74.83  0.1395  1.1707 
 
Breaks  Dates 
1        1980:6         
2        1978:6  1982:4       
3    1970:4    1978:6  1982:4       
4    1970:4    1978:6  1982:4  1986:2     
5    1970:6  1974:6  1978:6  1982:4  1986:2     
6  1965:5  1970:9  1974:5  1978:6  1982:4  1986:2     
7  1965:5  1970:9  1974:5  1978:6  1982:4  1986:2     
8  1965:5  1970:9  1974:5  1978:6  1982:4  1986:2  1989:12  1994:8 
Note: the 5% critical values are extrapolated from Table I, Bai and Perron (1998). 
 
The tests suggest that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected for all values of H, although 
the maximum value of sup F(H|0) is attained for H = 2 (125.92) with H = 5,6 in close 
proximity (123.22 and 124.74, respectively).  The sup F (H+1|H) indicates that for H < 
6, the null hypothesis is easily rejected, indicating that a value of H = 5 would be 
appropriate. These results seem to be confirmed by the information criteria: AIC selects a 
more generous specification with 5 breaks whereas BIC would suggest a more 
conservative specification with 2 breaks. We choose H = 5 because, for the purposes of 
our exercise, there is no bias in having redundant regimes (although there may be some 
loss of efficiency in the estimates of the impulse responses).  The estimated break dates 
match relatively well with institutional developments at the Federal Reserve, even for 
values of h that are larger than our final selection.  For instance, in 1970 the Federal 
Reserve revised its Regulation Q to eliminate interest-rate ceilings on bank certificates of 
deposit, and it formally adopted monetary targets with the intention to reduce inflation.    43
Further developments in 1972 included the introduction of new required-reserve ratios 
and the introduction of targets for the growth of money over a 6-month horizon.  We 
have already commented on the nonborrowed-reserves targeting regime spanning 
October 1979 to October 1982, which loosely coincides with the June 1978 to April 1982 
break dates detected. The February 1986 date can be associated with the end of Volcker's 
chairmanship.  Other dates that were not selected but related to institutional changes at 
the Fed include the beginning of free reserves targeting in 1966, which corresponds well 
to the detected May 1965 break date. The December 1989 break date coincides with the 
"Thanksgiving 1989 effect" described in Hamilton and Jordá (2000) and Demiralp and 
Jordá (2000). The August 1994 break date can be tied to the practice instituted by the Fed 
in February of that year of publicly announcing changes in the federal funds rate target 
after FOMC meetings. 
  At this juncture, we considered two alternatives.  The dates detected by the 
structural break tests can be connected broadly to conventional monetary-regime shifts 
for which we have relatively accurate documented shift-dates.  In the end however, rather 
than imposing our own priors, we decided to maintain the break dates detected by Bai 
and Perron's (1998) test for H = 5 under the view that, in practical terms, these well 
known shifts may have exerted their true effects with some lead or lag. 
 
  5.3 Estimating l 
Once we have determined the dates of monetary regime shifts, it is straightforward to 
compute the impulse responses of EM to shocks in FF (that is yt and mt in the notation of 
previous sections) as well as shocks in P, PCOM, NBRX, and DM2 for each of the H + 1   44
subsamples determined by the breaks in Table 2.  Each subsample VAR has the same 
structure.  For each subsample we compute a set of impulse-response functions such as 
those described in expression (27), which we then used to set up the system described by 
equations (29) to (31). 
  Estimation of this system yields an estimate of l = 0.57 with a standard error of 
0.14.
18  The estimate of l provides a direct measure of the existence of the Lucas critique.  
The fact that we find breaks in the monetary policy rule confirms the results of Estrella 
and Fuhrer (1999).  Yet to underwrite their conclusion that the Lucas critique is not 
quantitatively relevant, we would also have to have found that l = 1.  Instead, we found a 
value rather closer to the value for the mixing parameter between permanent-income and 
rule-of-thumb consumers in Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) test of the consumption 
function. 
  To understand what the estimate of l = 0.57 means consider Figure 1.
19  The top 
panel shows the output effect of an unanticipated impulse to FF on EM for three values 
of l.  An unanticipated impulse occurs when the monetary surprise term in square 
brackets in the middle term on the right-hand side of equation (17) takes a non-zero 
value.  Figure 1 plots the coefficients of the polynomial A(L) that provide the dynamic 
response to that shock.
20  The lower curve (circles) shows the function for the Lucasian 
case, l = 0.  Except for the scale factor (cmm0) this is the ordinary impulse response 
                                                 
18 Caution should be used in interpreting this standard error. Note that the regressors of the system used to 
estimate l have been generated from the subsample VARs and therefore, their sampling variation should be 
incorporated when evaluating the precision of the estimated l. 
19 This figure is the analogue of Cochrane’s (1998, p. 294) Fig. 6.  Our real variable is employment; his is 
output.   45
function for the structural VAR (see equation (20)).  The upper curve (squares) shows the 
function for the rule of thumb case, l = 1.  The quantitative responses are much more 
moderated in this case since systematic monetary policy acts to offset the monetary 
surprise.  Finally, the middle curve (triangles) shows the intermediate case in which the 
mixing parameter takes the estimated value, l = 0.57.  Although this value is near to the 
midpoint of the range of possible values for l, the quantitative responses are much closer 
to the rule of thumb case than to the Lucasian case, which corresponds closely to 
Cochrane’s (1998) conclusion that the economy acted more like an economy with no 
rational agents when even a relative few followed a rule of thumb. 
  The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the output responses of EM to an anticipated 
impulse to FF for the three values of l.  It shows the direct effect only – that is, it 
corresponds to the first term on the right-hand side of equation (17) rather than to the 
impulse-response function (calculated from equation (20)) that incorporates the indirect 
feedback of monetary policy on EM.  Each curve in the lower panel is a scaling of the 
corresponding curve in the upper panel by the appropriate value of l.  When l = 0 
(straight line marked with circles), there is no response at all:  in the Lucasian world only 
monetary surprises have real effects.  When l = 1 (squares), the curve is the same as the 
corresponding curve in the upper panel.  The two messages of the panel are as follows:  
first, except in the Lucasian case, anticipated policy has real effects; and, second, the 
direct effects of anticipated policy are uniformly more moderate than had the same policy 
action been unanticipated. 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 It is worth recalling that one of our identifying assumptions is A(L) is constant for a given l whatever the 
monetary regime, but that, in general, A(L) will be different for different ls.  Because the coefficients of the 
monetary policy rule do not enter into the dynamics reported here, Figure 1 is the same for all regimes.   46
 
6. Evaluating Systematic Monetary Policy 
With estimates of equation (16) in hand, we are now in a position to quantify the effects 
of systematic monetary policy.  We do this in three ways:  first, we present a 
decomposition of the effects of monetary policy into systematic and unsystematic 
responses to shocks to monetary policy and to shocks to employment; second, we 
compare the estimated systematic impulse-response functions from our identified 
structural macroeconometric model to the counterfactual experiments that Sims and Zha 
(1998) suggest as measures of systematic policy; and, finally, we consider counterfactual 
simulations of the structural macroeconometric model in the spirit of Sims’s (1999) 
counterfactual simulations.   
 
  6.1 The Systematic Monetary-Policy Component of  
         Impulse-Response Functions 
 
For each policy regime, the top panel of Figure 2 plots lA(L)Cmm, which according to 
equation (20) is the systematic component of the impulse-response function for EM to a 1 
percent positive shock to the federal funds rate (emt).  Similarly, the bottom panel plots 
lA(L)Cmy, which is the systematic component of the impulse-response function of EM to 
a 1 percent negative shock EM itself (eyt).   
  An unanticipated positive shock to the federal funds rate can be regarded as 
inadvertent tightening.  The top panel of Figure 2 shows that in every regime the initial 
effect is to lower employment.  In all but the 1974-78 regime, monetary policy sustains 
that tightening for some time, although in three of the regimes it is neutralized or reversed 
within two years.  However, for the 1960-70 regime, policy follows a pattern of sustained   47
tightening so that employment is ½ percent lower after two years.  A similar, but more 
substantial tightening occurs in the 1986-99 regime:  a nearly 2 percent fall after two 
years. 
  The lower-panel is perhaps more interesting for policy as it shows the systematic 
monetary response to an unanticipated real development.  A fall in employment is a 
surprise cooling of the economy.  In two of the regimes (1970-74 and 1982-86), policy 
more than reverses the shock – reaching a 1 percent increase at the end of two years.  In 
two of the regimes (1960-70 and 1986-91) policy accelerates the drop in employment – 
reaching around ½ percent further reduction after two years.  In the remaining two 
regimes, the behavior is mixed.  In both the 1974-76 and 1978-82 regime, the initial 
effect is to further reduce employment.  In the 1974-78 regime the employment shock is 
neutralized by nine months and reversed by one year.  Still, by the end of two years the 
net effect is about ½ percent further reduction.  In the 1978-82 regime, there is a similar 
reversal by nine months, but at the end of two years employment has been raised by ½ 
percent.  The behavior of the Federal Reserve does not correspond in any regime exactly 
to William McChesney Martin’s description of the Fed as taking away the punch bowl 
just as the party is getting started.  Faced with a dull party, the Fed, in three of the 
regimes, spikes the punch and, in the other three, laces it with poison.   In every regime, 
systematic monetary policy is important. 
 
6.2 A Comparison to Sims and Zha’s Counterfactual Experiment 
A number of recent papers employ counterfactual methodologies to assess the effects of 
systematic monetary policy.  Sims and Zha (1998) modify the equation that they identify   48
as the policy-reaction function while maintaining the rest of the equations in a structural 
VAR unchanged.  The authors concede that this would be an objectionable procedure 
given the Lucas critique since it ignores the endogenous response of the public to the new 
policy regime.  They argue, however, that the public would require time to learn about 
the new policy regime, so that the Lucas critique is unlikely to be operative over a 
relatively short forecast horizon.  Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) refine this 
defense of the counterfactual procedure with the argument that the Lucas critique is more 
important for some markets than for others.  Their counterfactual experiments are similar 
to those of Sims and Zha. 
  In practice, Sims and Zha’s procedure is to replace the equation for the federal 
funds rate in the structural VAR with a constant.  This amounts to a firmly maintained 
target for the federal funds rate.  The rationale for ignoring the Lucas critique in this case 
is equivalent to the assumption that l = 1 at least over the horizon of interest to the 
policymaker.  Yet, there is an inconsistency since, as we demonstrated in Section 4, using 
the usual structural VAR to assess the effect of monetary policy is equivalent to assuming 
that l = 0.  In any case, the evidence of this paper is that l is neither 1 nor 0.  The Lucas 
critique cannot be completely ignored, although as Figure 1 suggests it may not be 
quantitatively as important as when all agents have rational expectations.  But neither 
should we assume that the economy is affected only by surprises in the monetary 
instrument that have real effects as the usual impulse-response functions imply.   
  Our argument is that the attempt to isolate the systematic effects of monetary 
policy through the sort of counterfactual experiment suggested by Sims and Zha (1998) is 
likely to be misleading.  How misleading can be seen in Figure 3 in which we compare   49
estimates for each policy regime of an impulse-response function for a negative 1% 
shock to EM using their methodology to calculate the systematic effect of monetary 
policy on EM reported previously in Figure 2.  In every case, our estimates of the 
systematic effects of monetary policy are smaller in absolute value – typically period-by-
period and always by the end of two years – than those of Sims and Zha.  For the 1978-82 
regime, even though the two estimates end up at nearly the same value, the paths are 
nearly mirror images of each other.  For the 1986-99 regime, Sims and Zha’s method 
suggests that a negative employment shock is met with an increasingly large, 
systematically countervailing policy response.  In contrast, our estimates suggest a small 
response ratifying the shock in the midterm but offsetting it almost completely by the end 
of two years. 
 
6.3 A Counterfactual Simulation 
Sims (1999) conducts a counterfactual experiment in which he takes the monetary policy 
equation from the post-war periods and inserts it into a structural VAR for the pre-war 
period.  He then feeds the actual shocks from the pre-war VAR into the new “chimera” 
with the intent of seeing how the economy would have fared during the Great Depression 
had it had the post-war monetary policy in place – would the modern Fed have done 
better than the Fed in fact did in the period between the two World Wars?  This 
counterfactual is open to the same objection that we raised against Sims and Zha’s other 
counterfactual experiment:  it is an inadequate and inconsistent response to the Lucas 
critique.  One problem is that the “structural” VAR is not structural enough to sustain the 
counterfactual experiment in the face of the evidence that Lucas critique is in fact   50
operative to some degree.  And, as before, the usual impulse-response function makes 
sense only in the surprise-only Lucasian economy of l = 0. 
  In contrast, to the degree that our identifying assumptions are correct, we can 
perform a legitimate counterfactual experiment.  Like Sims, we consider a turbulent time, 
but one closer to our own time – the period at the end of the 1970s through the double-dip 
recessions of the early 1980s.  This is the period of the Federal Reserve’s nonborrowed-
reserve operating regime.  Our counterfactual experiment uses the shocks from the period 
1978:7 to 1982:4, which is the period indicated by our break tests that essentially 
overlaps the period of recessions and volatile interest rates.  We refer to this period as 
“Volcker (Actual),” designating it by the Federal Reserve chairman in office through 
most of it.  The shocks and appropriate initial conditions are fed into the structural 
macroeconometric models identified for the regimes 1974:6 to 1978:6 (“Burns-Miller”) 
and 1986:2 to 1999:1 (“Greenspan”) – each also designated by the corresponding 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
21 
  The results of the counterfactual experiment presented in Figure 4 are interesting 
– if not completely intuitive.  The shaded area displayed on the six panels in Figure 4 
corresponds to the July 1980 - July 1981 recession and the original variables of the VAR 
are appropriately transformed to be more readily interpretable.
22  At the start of the 
recession, the decline in employment growth is similar under the stewardships of  
                                                 
21 Recall that to identify the structural macroeconometric model, A(L) and B(L) (and, of course, l) are 
assumed to be constant across regimes.  Feeding the shocks from one regime in the model for another 
amounts, then, only to changing the monetary rule.  This is a little different from Sims’s (1998) experiment.  
Sims assumes that the pre-war and post-war periods are characterized by different real structures as well as 
different monetary rules. 
22 The annual growth rates of employment, M2, and the nonborrowed reserve ratio as well as inflation, and 
inflation in sensitive commodities, are calculated as the twelfth difference of the logarithms of the levels. 
The real Federal Funds Rate is calculated as the nominal rate minus the inflation rate.   51
Greenspan and Volcker (somewhat more dramatic under the Burns-Miller scenario). 
However, the decline in the real federal funds rate a couple of periods into the recession 
is more dramatic under Volcker's chairmanship than it is under Greenspan’s.  This has the 
effect of reducing the fall in employment growth much more quickly, with employment 
growth attaining positive values eight months into the recession. By contrast, the real 
federal funds rate declines much less markedly under Greenspan (the trough of this 
decline is eight months into the recession) and Burns-Miller (the trough is reached five 
months into the recession instead), and over a longer period of time. This causes a deeper 
and more protracted decline in employment growth, and a subsequent longer recovery 
relative to Volcker.  Upon exiting the recession, both Greenspan and Burns-Miller 
aggressively ratchet up the federal funds rate but with an eight month lag relative to 
Volcker. 
The policies of both Greenspan and Burns-Miller would have held the federal 
funds rate at a substantially lower level than was actually the case under Volcker.  More 
important, perhaps, is that both Greenspan and the Burns-Miller would have delivered a 
much less volatile federal funds rate during the recession than Volcker actually did.  As a 
result, they would have had substantially more difficulty in hitting the M2 monetary 
targets that were one of the guides to monetary policy at the time even though there are 
few appreciable differences in the behavior of the nonborrowed reserves to total reserves 
ratio.   
Perhaps the most unintuitive result of this experiment has to do with the behavior 
of inflation and inflation in sensitive materials.  In particular, a rate of inflation for 
consumer goods higher under Volcker than under the others is consistent with a relatively   52
quicker recovery from the recessions.  What is puzzling is why the rate of inflation for 
sensitive materials should remain low under the Volcker regime but not under the others 
while general inflation accelerated. 
The real outcomes are mildly surprising, since Paul Volcker was widely regarded 
as running a tighter monetary policy than had his predecessors, Arthur Burns and William 
Miller.  The Volcker regime exhibits greater employment than would have been the case 
under either the Burns-Miller or the Greenspan regimes.  The correlative consequences 
for inflation – consistent with the Phillips curve – would have been lower prices in the 
two regimes with lower employment and indeed would have turned into disinflation by 
the end of the period. 
  The difference between the configurations of employment, inflation, and interest 
rates produced by Volcker’s policy compared with the alternatives is consistent with the 
Federal Reserve having adjusted the federal funds rate in a manner that adapted to the 
higher inflation – in effect building higher expectations of inflation into policy.  What 
remains difficult to understand, however, is why the prices of sensitive commodities 




  Our goal was to understand, not only the nature and significance of systematic 
monetary policy but also to make some sense of the voluminous literature based in 
structural VARs.  The great tension in the empirical analysis of monetary policy is 
between the need for a structural account that can support the kind of counterfactual   53
analysis needed for policy analysis and the need for modesty on the part of 
macroeconometricians in their claims for empirical warrant (or even credibility) for the 
assumptions used to identify that structure.  Lucas’s original program set a high standard 
for the requisite structural detail.  Sims’s original VAR program advised a high degree of 
modesty.  Macroeconomics has tried to steer between their competing claims ever since.  
Cochrane (1998) was a warning to the structural VAR camp to steer toward the Lucas 
light.  What we hope to have achieved in this paper is to demonstrate that there is deeper 
water in that direction. 
  The results of this study are preliminary.  We have followed other recent studies 
in adopting a particular contemporaneous causal ordering of the structural VAR.  But this 
is a highly contested area.  Different causal structures could significantly affect our 
results.  Similarly, there remain questions about the identification of monetary policy 
regimes.  And there are questions not really addressed here at all of how to characterize 
monetary policy.  We assumed that the federal funds rate was the policy instrument.  It 
would be worth exploring whether a larger block of monetary-policy variables could be 
analyzed in a similar manner.  Finally, there are, of course, many counterfactual 
experiments that we could address beyond the particular case of the early 1980s.  What 
we have accomplished – even in this preliminary form – is to show that there is an 
empirically workable template on which a more refined and comprehensive study can be 
based. 
  Although preliminary, our results are interesting.  First, the economy is best 
characterized as composed of a mixture of agents, some of whom operate according to 
the new classical paradigm (rational expectations, short-run neutrality of money) and   54
some of whom appear to follow rules of thumb.  The estimate of l = 0.57 could be read 
as saying Lucas was 43 percent right in his early new-classical model of the 
macroeconomy.  Second, even with only half the economy in the rule-of-thumb camp, the 
economy behaves quantitatively and qualitatively substantially as if Lucas had been 
wrong altogether about the unimportance of systematic and anticipated monetary 
policies.  Third, Lucas is correct, nonetheless, that the aggregate reactions of the 
economy are conditioned on policy regimes and the analysis of what happens when a 
regime changes – in practice as well as in theory – requires some structural knowledge.  
The key assumption of this paper is that the coarse structural knowledge suggested in 
Cochrane’s decomposition of the effects of monetary policy into anticipated and 
unanticipated components is sufficient – and very likely the best that we can practically 
accomplish – to reach substantive results.   55
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Figure 1: Response of Employment to the Components of a Monetary Shock













Response of EM to a 1% Shock in FF due to the Systematic









Response of EM to a -1% Shock in EM due to the Systematic
Component of Monetary Policy

















































Figure 3: The Monetary Amplification/Mitigation of a -1% Employment (EM) Shock to Employment:
A Comparison between Sims and Zha, and Cochrane's Decompositions
1960:1 - 1970:6 1970:6 - 1974:6
1974:6 - 1978:6 1978:6 - 1982:4
1982:4 - 1982:4 1986:2 - 1999:1
NOTES:
Cochrane: denotes the difference between the traditional impulse response function from the VAR and
the orthogonal component of the response to monetary policy obtained on the basis of equation (22).
Sims and Zha: denotes the difference between the traditional impulse response function from the





























































































Figure 4: Counterfactual Simulations
Fed Chairmen Performance During the 1979:7 - 1982:4 Period
Note: The simulations replace the FF equation of the VAR estimated over the 1978:7 - 1982:4 period (Volcker chairmanship)
with those estimated over the 1974:6 - 1978:6 period (Burns-Miller chairmanships) and the 1986:2 - 1999:1 period (Greenspan
chairmanship). July 1980 - July 1981 recession depicted as shaded area for all graphs.